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1 Introduction
Buying online has specific asymmetric information problems: due to physical
distance, potential buyers cannot properly assess the quality of the product or
the handling of the supplier concerning delivery and complaints. The challenge
for high-quality firms to communicate their quality is also present in an internet
price-comparison (shopbot) setting: here, the shopbot intermediary facilitates
the comparison of prices by constructing a website where all suppliers of a
particular product are listed on one page. Such markets reduce search costs and
increase price awareness enormously; therefore, online sellers have an urgent
need to differentiate themselves by service quality, or they may use obfuscation
strategies in order to avoid ruinous price wars (Clay et al. (2001) and Ellison
and Ellison (2009)).
In order to solve the asymmetric information problem concerning the qual-
ity or reliability of an agent, online markets typically provide a system of
reputation building that relies on customer feedback, which is structured and
organized by the market maker. Examples of auctions (eBay) and shopbots
(pricewatch.com or epinions.com) abound. A self-organized reputation mech-
anism is not without challenges, however, because of the potential for manip-
ulation and the associated credibility problems. From a market design as well
as from an economic policy point of view, it is very important to understand
whether these self-organized forms of reputation building and presentation are
sufficient to overcome the adverse selection problem or whether some form of
quality certification from an outside institution is necessary. An official certi-
fication of a given minimum quality - often taking the form of a quality seal -
may be desirable for a seller if the underlying procedure and issuing institution
guarantee the credibility of the quality seal.
In this paper we compare the impact of a self-organized reputation mech-
anism to the impact of quality seals on demand for online sellers. To do so, we
use longitudinal data from a large Austrian shopbot - www.geizhals.at - where
we can observe the development of reputation as well as the granting and loss
of two different quality seals over time. To our knowledge, ours is the first pa-
per to quantitatively and systematically compare the importance of reputation
to certification, which is an essential issue for the design of such markets. It
turns out that quality seals are more important drivers of consumer demand
than self-organized reputation; the impact of reputation vanishes once we in-
troduce firm fixed effects. Interestingly, the costs to achieve certification have
an influence on the credibility of the seal, which, in turn, is honored by the
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consumers via higher demand: Quality seals that have higher costs for certifi-
cation and are established and regularly checked by an independent institution
attract higher demand. While our empirical results clearly provide a role for
an official certification process to alleviate the adverse selection problem in
online markets, the credibility and independence of the certification process
are of crucial importance.
2 Reputation and Certification as Signaling
Strategies
Dewally and Ederington (2006) discuss four possible strategies for retailers in
asymmetric information situations to signal high quality: reputation, certifi-
cation, warranties, and disclosure. In our current application of the Austrian
internet shopbot, warranties and disclosure are not available. Warranties can
in principle be issued by the individual firm or the market maker. The useful-
ness of warranties as a substitute for reputation is analyzed by Roberts (2011)
for an online market for agricultural machinery. He finds that an institutional-
ized “money back guarantee” - even one issued by the market maker - did not
determine prices or sales in this market, and therefore was no substitute for
reputation, which might be due to credibility problems with the warranties.
Voluntary disclosure of quality information is another strategy that may
be used predominantly by high-quality sellers. If disclosure is costless and
if some other conditions apply, the so-called “unraveling result” will hold:
starting with the highest-quality firm, all firms have an incentive to disclose
in order to distinguish themselves from lower-quality firms (Grossman (1981)
and Milgrom (1981)). In practice, however, disclosure is neither costless nor
perfect: e.g., in eBay auctions, the seller can only transmit pictures of the
offered product, which offers at least some limited opportunity to disclose the
quality. Lewis (2011) shows for eBay used car auctions that low-cost sellers
post more photos, which, in turn, increases the sales price of the car.1
Another strategy is to invest resources to build a reputation for high-
quality products or a good price-quality ratio (Shapiro (1983), Klein and Leﬄer
(1981)). Online markets provide an ideal setting for self-organized reputation
building. Dellarocas (2003) analyzes the differences between Internet-based
feedback mechanisms and traditional word-of-mouth networks and stresses
problems of noisy data: costumer feedback-based reputation may be noisy
1In their survey, Dranove and Jin (2010) use a broader definition of disclosure that
includes certification by third-party agencies.
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because (i) different consumers may use different standards to measure qual-
ity, (ii) consumers who do report may be a selective sample of all customers,
particularly those who are more picky, and (iii) as feedback is in general not
easily verifiable, it may be prone to gaming.
Dewan and Hsu (2004) and Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003) find that positive
feedback or a higher net score increases prices; in particular, the first negative
feedback reduces sales considerably. Moreover, customer feedback seems to
be endogeneous: after the first negative feedback, the probability of receiving
further negative feedback increases (Cabral and Hortac¸su, 2010).2
While both voluntary disclosure and warranty and reputation mechanisms
may be self-organized by either the market participants or the market maker,
certification typically requires an outside body, which can either be a govern-
ment institution or a private intermediary. Certification may be defined as a
process whereby an unobservable quality level of some product or firm is made
known to the consumer through some labeling system, which is usually issued
by an independent third party (Auriol and Schilizzi, 2003). In order to be
meaningful, certification must be costly to the firm, and the required quality
standards must be regularly checked. Moreover, the reputation of the certifica-
tion depends crucially on the reputation of the certifier. Theoretical analyses3
focus on incentives for the certifier to give unbiased reports, the impact of cer-
tification on the market structure, and the effects on size and quality level of
the market. While a certification process can, in principle, provide a cardinal
measure of a firm’s quality (e.g. hospital report cards), many certificates only
provide information about a minimum quality level the firm must exceed (e.g.,
quality seals).4
For e-tailing, such quality seals have become increasingly common.5 Whether
the quality seal WebTrust strengthens purchasing intentions for both known
and unknown companies was investigated by Kaplan and Nieschwietz (2003).
Odom et al. (2002) find that the leading brands of web seals in the United
States (Verisign, TRUSTe, Good Housekeeping and CPA WebTrust) addressed
2See Hoffman et al. (1999), Froomkin (1996), Friedman et al. (2000) and Grabner-
Kraeuter (2002) for early discussions about the importance of trust for online shopping
relative to brick-and-mortar stores.
3See Dranove and Jin (2010) for a survey.
4Licensing is another form of certification to set a minimum standard. If a license granted
by a government agency is necessary to enter the industry, the lower-quality end of the
market is automatically cut off.
5Other well-known examples of certification include the ISO 9000 quality management
system (Corbet et al., 2005), food safety (Crespi and Marette, 2001), organic food (Lohr,
1998), teacher quality (Angrist and Guryan, 2008), and training standards (Acemoglu and
Pischke, 2000).
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only a few of online purchasers’ fears and concerns, and there was a large gap
between consumers’ needs for assurance and what they felt was being offered
by the web seals.6 Lala et al. (2002) explored consumers’ ability to differentiate
between web seals of different qualities. They found a strong effect related to
consumers’ preference for a high information quality seal, but found that cus-
tomers failed to demonstrate interest in a low information quality seal. These
analyses are mostly of a descriptive nature, and are not able to directly com-
pare certification with self-organized methods for reputation. An exception
is the study by Baye and Morgan (2003), who find that firms achieve higher
prices in a shopbot when they are certified by CNet; this price advantage
disappeared, though, as more firms gained access to the certificate.
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
We use data from Austria’s largest price search engine (www.geizhals.at),
which compares product offers from different e-commerce retailers7. As geizhals.at
is Austria’s uncontested market leader, our data cover the whole Austrian on-
line market, including suppliers from other countries (especially Germany) that
are interested in Austrian e-commerce business. Together with the ranking of
retailers’ prices, the website indicates additional offer characteristics, as shown
in Figure 1 for an arbitrarily chosen digital camera. The offers are ordered
according to their prices in the first column. The second column informs the
consumer about the company logo and whether the seller is endowed with a
quality seal. Online feedback and the number of consumers that already have
assessed that particular retailer are shown in the third column. Column four
includes information on availability and shipping costs. A somewhat detailed
description of the product offered by the retailer can be found in the last
column.
The website classifies products into categories, subcategories, and subsub-
categories.8 For computational reasons, we restrict our data to the subcategory
“digital cameras” in the category “ photos” from May 1, 2006 through Decem-
ber 30, 2008. We use weekly data as observation units. Therefore, aggregates
have been used for variables that refer to a certain time period (e.g., clicks),
6Edelman (2011) argues that there is adverse selection of companies acquiring trust
certification for website safety from TRUSTe: the trustworthiness of certified sites was
found to be lower than that of uncertified sites.
7The English translation of “geizhals” is “nickel nurser”.
8As an example, the category “Video/Photo/TV” contains the subcategory “TV sets”
and the subsubcategory “30-39 inch LCD TV sets.”
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and time-weighted averages have been calculated for variables that vary within
these periods of time (e.g., prices). In total, we observe 4,365,711 price offers
for 911 retailers j of 2,665 products i in 139 weeks t. From our 911 retailers in
the sample, 297 shops are based in Austria, 612 in Germany, and two in the
Netherlands.
Two kinds of information about retailers’ service quality are presented on
geizhals.at.
Self-Organized Firm Reputation: Customers can evaluate retailers’ service
characteristics9 with grades between 1 (very satisfactory) and 5 (very unsatis-
factory). Geizhals.at lists the average firm assessments of customer evaluations
filed within the last 365 days on the website’s main page, which summarizes all
offers for a specific good (see Figure 1).10 As quality of information is crucial
for the business model of a price search engine, Geizhals.at tries to ensure a
high quality level of customer evaluations: The filing of an evaluation requires
registration at geizhals.at. Moreover, the price search engine makes a special
effort to verify evaluation reliability and invalidates unreasonable customer
evaluations.
Quality Seals : Sellers are also allowed to present the seals of their external
quality certification agencies. These seals are also listed below the firm’s name
at the website’s main page with the firm’s price offers (see Figure 1). Currently,
there are two e-commerce quality seals used at geizhals.at. The first is a seal
issued by the Austrian Chamber of Trade, Commerce and Industry (WKO)11.
A retailer is allowed to carry the WKO seal if it signs a letter of commitment
that requires, rather unspecifically, the offering of certain service features (e.
g., an offer of counseling before and after purchase, delivery, and service).
The WKO seal is only eligible for Austrian e-commerce shops. There is no
certification process based on whether the retailer actually offers the required
service features. Moreover, the seal is free of charge for the retailer. In contrast
to this is the Euro-Label seal, issued by the EHI Retail Institute GmbH12, an
independent association. The seal defines a code of conduct for e-commerce
9Geizhals applies the following list of service characteristics that can be individually as-
sessed by the clients: navigation on the site, assortment, availability, service, price level,
shipping cost, product information, payment methods, terms of business, website perfor-
mance, and satisfaction with the handling of the offer (order transaction, validity of infor-
mation, confirmation of order and tracking of shipment, delivery time, packing and content
of consignment, service after shipment).
10Customers interested in perusing more detailed customer evaluations have access to
average grades for the last three months, to the average ratings with respect to single service
criteria, and to open comments that customers provide with their evaluations.
11http://portal.wko.at
12http://www.euro-label.com
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shops and includes intense audit procedures with yearly inspections. Retailers
must pay for the seal and the certification process. Compared to the WKO seal,
the Euro-Label seal requires much higher monetary and service investments
by the retailer. The above two institutions have provided us with information
about when a seal is granted to or revoked from any of the e-tailers.
Of the 911 e-commerce shops in our sample, 113 retailers had either the
WKO seal or the Euro Label seal at some point during the study period. Of
these, 54 retailers had a Euro-Label seal and 64 had a WKO seal. Over the
entire observation period, however, more retailers were assigned a Euro-Label
seal than a WKO seal. As shown in Figure 2, a maximum of 47 sellers with a
Euro Label seal and 43 retailers with a WKO seal were listed at geizhals.at at
any one point.
We want to measure the impact of different quality indicators on con-
sumers’ purchasing behavior. Unfortunately, we can not observe the actual
purchase decision, since this act happens at the e-commerce retailers’ own
websites. We can, however, use a proxy variable for consumers’ demand. Re-
ferral requests (clicks) from the geizhals.at website to a specific website are
the total number of clicks of consumers at geizhals.at on a link for product i
of retailer j. These referral requests measure the attention paid to a specific
retailer. If attention correlates in a stable way with actual purchases across
different retailers, we could use these referral requests as a proxy for actual
consumers’ demand. 13 A still better proxy for actual buying decisions is
the concept of the last click through (LCT) (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2000):
during the purchasing decision of a specific good, a customer may visit several
websites and compare the characteristics of the shops (e.g., terms of trade,
service before and after sale). In the sequence of these referral requests, the
last click in a shop has a higher purchase probability, as the consumer is ap-
parently no longer interested in the shop characteristics of other e-commerce
sites. In our data, an identification of the LCT is possible because the sequence
of clicks by an individual customer can be identified by a unique web browser
cookie.14 Multiple product searches by an individual require the identification
of different search periods. For the clustering of clicks into different search
spells, a Grubbs’ test for outlier detection of particularly long time periods
between the referral requests was applied. Since even a cluster of clicks within
13Note that geizhals.at gets paid according to the number of clicks a firm receives through
Geihals.at.
14In the identification of the LCT, we have omitted all clicks from customers with web
browser settings that do not allow the transmission of cookies on the local PC. Customers
who use the same web browser (cookie) cannot be separated from one another.
6
a search interval of one hour would have outliers, we must adopt some minimal
requirements for a search interval: a self-contained search interval must con-
tain at least 3 (5) clicks, and intervals must be separated by at least one week
(month) without clicks. If there are too few clicks or if the “click-less” period
is too short the adjacent search spells are connected (for further information
on this definition of LCTs, see Dulleck et al. (2011)).
Table 1 shows the descriptive summary statistics of the variables used in
our empirical analysis. The variable Euro-Label is 1 if the retailer at time point
t has the Euro Label and 0 otherwise. The same holds for the WKO seal. The
Last-click-through (LCT) per observation unit (week) has a maximum of 544
clicks, a minimum of 0, and a mean value of 1.008. The price of the product
is covered by the variable Relative Best Price (RBP), and is calculated by
dividing the price of retailer j’s product i by the lowest price offered for this
product. Its minimum and maximum values are 1 and 4.991. Observations
five times larger than the best price have been excluded from the analysis, as
data input errors by retailers might be responsible for these unreasonably high
prices15.
Availability describes the availability of the product: If the seller had spec-
ified that the product is “available at short notice” or just “available,” the
dummy is 1: if the product is not available, it is 0. Self-Organised Firm Rep-
utation describes the average score of firm evaluations made by consumers in
the last month. Its mean value is 1.723 and the variable ranges between 1
and 5, where 1 is the best grade a consumer can give. The variable Product
Assessment represents the ratio of the number of positive evaluations of the
product to the total number of evaluations within the last month.
At geizhals.at, different forms of shipping costs are reported. Thus, there
are differences in costs related to cash in advance, payment by credit card, and
cash on delivery. We use cash in advance in our empirical analysis as we lose
the fewest observations with this form of shipping cost.16 The variables Trend
and Trend2 measure the life-span and the squared life-time of each product,
respectively. Additionally, missing flags are included for the variables Product
Assessment, Self-Organised Firm Reputation, and Shipping Costs ; the missing
values were imputed with the mean of the available values for each variable.
As each product can be offered by different retailers at different points in
time, we have an unbalanced panel. For the estimation of the demand for
15In total, 695, or 0.016% of our observations were deleted. Our results only change
marginally if we include this group of price offers.
16Shipping cost is the only variable that we must parse from a text field. Therefore, 10%
of the missing cases are coded with the mean shipping cost.
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retailer j’s product i at time t, the following model is considered:
yijt = αi + θj + µt + βxijt + γwjt + ijt. (1)
Here, αi, θj, and µt represent the fixed effects for firms, products, and
time, respectively. The covariates xijt include the price of product i of retailer
j relative to the best price offered for this product, the product assessment,
the availability of the product i of retailer j (which was valid for the longest
time period within the week under observation), and shipping costs. yijt is a
measure of consumer demand (LCTs). wjt is a vector of observable covariates
varying at the firm level over time only. In our regressions, wjt includes the
two indicator variables for the WKO seal and the Euro Label as well as the
self-organized reputation of the retailers.
In the above model, we are confronted with the following econometric
issues:
(i) As the dataset is three dimensional, we must deal with the computa-
tional complexity of a three-way fixed effects model (FE-model). We assume
that the unobserved time component µt can be treated as fixed. Thus, µt can
be estimated directly by introducing time dummies into the vector of covari-
ates, and therefore, in what follows, time dummies are dropped. Product fixed
effects are swept out by subtracting the group mean for all observations (see,
for instance, Andrews et al. (2006)). Given our sample size, we are confronted
with severe computational and prohibitively large memory capacity problems.
Therefore, we follow Cornelissen (2006), who suggests a memory-saving de-
composition in which the cross product matrix will be generated for the least
squares equation without generating dummies for the group effects. As the
cross-product matrices are of considerably lower dimension than the design
matrix, the required computer memory can be reduced substantially. To cover
within-group dependence in the estimation of the standard errors, we cluster
them on a product-retailer pair index.17
(ii) Obviously, the price relative to the price leader (RBP) cannot realis-
tically be assumed to be exogenous since retailers may change their prices in
response to the quantity demanded. Pursuing an idea of Hausman (1996), we
instrument the relative best price of a retailer j for a given product k with
the average relative best price of all other products of the same retailer j in
the other online markets (categories) available (i.e., excluding the category
17We also ran regressions where the standard errors were calculated by two-way clustering,
as proposed by Miller et al. (2009). The results are robust in terms of significance and, thus,
are not separately reported here.
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“photos”):
ARBPjt =
∑N˜jt
i=1RBPijt
N˜jt
where i /∈ {photos} is the product a retailer j is listing in other categories
and N˜jt is the total number of products a retailer is offering at time t in all
categories but “photos.” In the first stage, the instrument ARBPjt has a
strong and significant impact on the relative price.18 The exclusion restriction
is particularly convincing because the relative price a firm charges for unre-
lated products should have no impact on demand in one particular market.
Moreover, customers cannot easily infer the price-setting policies of particu-
lar retailers because they cannot inspect the complete price list of a retailer.
The organization of the website allows only price comparisons for one partic-
ular product across firms, so consumers cannot determine the overall pricing
behavior of one particular firm.
4 Results
We start with a model including product and time fixed effects but with no
fixed effects for individual firms (Table 2). Last-click-throughs are used as
demand indicators. In Columns 1 and 3, we use ordinary least squares meth-
ods, while in Columns 2 and 4, a 2SLS procedure is used with the average
relative best price from other markets as an instrument. Instrumenting the
relative price does not change the results to a large extent; all coefficients re-
main very similar both in terms of size and statistical significance. Therefore,
we concentrate the discussion on the IV results.
When we include only the Euro-Label certification in the model (Columns 1
and 2) we find demand enhancing properties for both self-organized reputation
and the Euro-Label; all coefficients are highly significant. The quantitative
effects are both sizable, but the impact of certification is stronger. Certification
with a Euro-Label increases LCTs for a firm by 0.44 per week, which is almost
half the mean value of LCTs (1.008) per week. On the other hand, if the firm
were able to increase its reputation by one point (e.g., on the negative scale
from 2 to 1), which is more than one standard deviation (0.75), demand would
increase by 0.23 LCTs per week.
Including the WKO seal in Columns 3 and 4 does not change these results
18The Cragg-Donald F statistic amounts to about 183,070, and the Anderson-Rubin F
test is about 2,939.
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at all. Interestingly, the WKO seal carries a negative coefficient, although
it is very small. This remarkable difference in the effect of the certificates
can be explained by the credibility of the issuing institutions. On the one
hand, the Verein zur Fo¨rderung der kundenfreundlichen Nutzung des Internet
is an independent association engaged in consumer protection. On the other
hand, the Wirtschaftskammer O¨sterreich” which is issuing the WKO seal is
the official entrepreneurs’ association in Austria. Moreover, the two seals differ
in their certification procedures: While the WKO seal is easy to obtain, Euro-
Label certification requires intensive audits with recurrent inspections later
on. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to discriminate between the two
competing hypotheses of trust in the issuing certifier and cost of obtaining the
certification.
We find the coefficients of the control variables to be according to expec-
tations. The price of a firm relative to the best price in the market has a
strong negative effect: if a firm charges a price 10% higher than the best price,
its demand would go down by 0.36 LCTs per week. Shipping costs, however,
have no significant effect on LCTs (they are even slightly positive in Table 3);
previous research (Hossain and Morgan, 2006) has shown that customers treat
regular prices and additional charges for shipping and handling quite differ-
ently. Obviously, price obfuscation strategies via shipping costs are effective in
our data (see also Ellison and Ellison (2009)). Product assessment, which may
vary over time, has a positive effect on demand, as does the expeditious avail-
ability of the product. Available products and products with a high number
of consumer recommendations are demanded more often.
In the next step, we include the firm fixed effects in the regressions (Table
3). Introducing firm fixed effects should resolve any time-invariant firm char-
acteristics and allow a strict pre-post comparison of the demand effects of firm
certification. Moreover, it will capture only the time-varying effects of firm rep-
utation. Our results show that in general, most estimated coefficients are lower
than those that were estimated omitting firm fixed effects. Self-organized firm
reputation drops numerically to zero and is totally insignificant. This might
be due to less variation of firm reputation over time. In contrast to this, the
impact of the Euro-Label remains strong and significant, although at a some-
what lower level. Comparing a firm before and after certification with the
Euro-Label show an LCT increase of 0.16 per week, which is still one-sixth of
the mean LCTs. Again, the WKO seal has no impact on demand.
The model with firm fixed effects thus corroborates the evidence that cer-
tification is more important than self-organized reputation in a costumer feed-
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back mechanism. The effect of reputation might be less easily identifiable
in the firm fixed effects model due to the slow change of this indicator over
time; still, the impact of reputation in the model without firm fixed effects is
considerably lower than the impact of Euro-Label seal certification.
In the next step, we want to account explicitly for the rank of the firm
that is granted a seal (Table 4). Does the impact of certification vary with
the rank of the firm in the geizhals.at listing (the cheapest offers are listed
at the top)? Our classification of the dummies is based on the assumption
that consumers cannot easily comprehend the whole list of offers, which can
include as many as 200 firms. Consumers must scroll through the entire list
in order to get the whole picture of supply. When searching for a product,
customers can see five to ten offers on their screens at once, depending on the
amount of product information provided by the firms and the size of the screen.
Thus, we distinguish between three different field positions: a retailer with the
Euro-Label seal is among the five cheapest offers (EL & among Top-1:5); the
quote is between the sixth and tenth (EL & among Top-6:10); the offer ranks
eleventh or higher (EL & among Top-11:...). The same holds for the WKO
seal.
We find evidence that the Euro-Label seal has its highest impact for firms
listed between the sixth and tenth place. The firms with the Euro-Label seal
have demand enhanced by more than 0.86 LCTs per week compared to firms
with no seal. Interestingly, this positive effect on demand is smaller for firms
at the top of the listing. Firms among the best five offers observe, on average,
an increase in LCTs of 0.49 clicks per week. It seems that the top listed
firms cannot exploit the seal to the same degree as firms between the fifth and
tenth place, as they already have the signal with the low prices. In contrast,
firms between the fifth and tenth place can compensate for their lower ranking
with the seal. However, when ranked at 11 or below, we find no evidence
that having the Euro-Label seal is related to an increase in LCTs. The bad
ranking of these firms cannot be overcome by the seal at this point. Regarding
the WKO seal, the position of retailers seems to be totally irrelevant; similar
to the simple model shown above, the coefficients are quite small and not
statistically significant.
5 Summary and Conclusions
In online markets, it is essential for retailers to establish mutual trust with
customers. As consumers are not able to examine physical good itself and
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customer-retailer relationships typically occur only sporadically, it is impor-
tant that retailers offer enough information to counteract obvious information
asymmetries concerning their service characteristics and credibility. Thus,
appropriate feedback mechanisms such as third-party certification and self-
organized reputation mechanisms are needed. The literature so far has fo-
cused exclusively on self-organized reputation mechanisms brought about by
consumer evaluations and formal certification processes resulting in awarded
quality seals. This paper is the first to compare the different effectivenesses of
reputation and certification in online markets.
From the point of view of market design, it is very important to determine
whether a self-organized reputation mechanism is sufficient to overcome infor-
mational asymmetry or whether a formal certification of some sort - be it from
an official or private institution - is also necessary. Using data from an Aus-
trian price comparison site, we were able to show that customers react more
strongly to an official certification as compared to a self-organized reputation
mechanism. In a simple demand model without firm fixed effects, we find that
the effect of having a certificate is quantitatively stronger than the effect of a
better firm reputation. When we introduce firm fixed effects, the impact of
reputation disappears completely. In such a model, identification comes from
changes in reputation or certification over time within a firm.
Moreover, the type of certification is important as well. In our data, we
can observe two quality seals: one established from the official employers’ as-
sociation, which is relatively easy to obtain, and another from an independent
consumer club, which requires more extensive and repeated auditing and check-
ing. While the former has practically no impact on consumers, being awarded
the latter attracts considerably higher demand. Unfortunately, in our case, we
cannot differentiate between the impact of independence and the credibility of
the issuing institution on the one hand and the costs of the quality seal on the
other which leaves room for further research in other markets.
Our results are important for the design of many newly-constructed mar-
kets, with a shopbot as an excellent example: in these markets, market-makers
must specify the rules of the game. Relieving information asymmetries relat-
ing to the quality of goods and services is an important aspect thereof. We
have shown that an investment into an independent and costly certification
procedure may be worthwhile over and above routinely setting up a costumer
feedback mechanism.
12
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Figure 1: Outcome of an arbitrary product search at http://geizhals.at.
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Figure 2: WKO seal and Euro-Label (Digital Cameras)
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